Corporate Governance and Acquisitions: Acquirer Wealth Effects in the Netherlands by Jong, A. (Abe) de et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance and Acquisitions:  
Acquirer Wealth Effects in the Netherlands 
 
 
Abe de Jong, Marieke van der Poel and Michiel Wolfswinkel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Report Series reference number ERS-2007-016-F&A 
Publication  January 2007 
Number of pages 48 
Persistent paper URL  
Email address corresponding author ajong@rsm.nl 
Address  Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
 RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics  
 Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
 P.O.Box 1738  
 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  + 31 10 408 1182   
Fax: + 31 10 408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl
 
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
Abstract We examine 865 acquisitions by Dutch industrial firms over the period 1993–2004. Theoretical 
work based on principal–agent problems predicts that managers of exchange-listed corporations 
may pursue acquisitions even when these do not add value for the shareholders. Corporate 
governance structures serve to constrain managers in their acquisition activity. In this chapter we 
measure the shareholder wealth effects of acquisitions and the factors that determine these 
wealth effects, including the governance characteristics of corporations. Firms in the Netherlands 
are interesting from the perspective of corporate governance, because the managerial board has 
a relatively strong position vis-à-vis shareholders. Several takeover defenses commonly used in 
the Netherlands not only limit shareholder influence during takeover battles, but also in absence 
of such fights. On the other hand, ownership is relatively concentrated, which may provide 
shareholders with the incentives and power to monitor the management. The average abnormal 
stock return following acquisition announcements is 1.1%, which is a significant positive effect. 
There is only a significant negative impact of the so-called structured regime, a situation where 
several shareholder rights are delegated to the supervisory board. This result suggests that 
governance improves acquisition decisions. 
Free Keywords Mergers & acquisitions, Corporate governance, The Netherlands, Event study 
Availability The ERIM Report Series is distributed through the following platforms:  
Academic Repository at Erasmus University (DEAR), DEAR ERIM Series Portal
Social Science Research Network (SSRN), SSRN ERIM Series Webpage
Research Papers in Economics (REPEC), REPEC ERIM Series Webpage
Classifications The electronic versions of the papers in the ERIM report Series contain bibliographic metadata 
by the following classification systems: 
Library of Congress Classification, (LCC) LCC Webpage
Journal of Economic Literature, (JEL), JEL Webpage
ACM Computing Classification System CCS Webpage
Inspec Classification scheme (ICS), ICS Webpage
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance and Acquisitions: 
Acquirer Wealth Effects in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
Abe de Jong 
RSM Erasmus University 
 
Marieke van der Poel 
RSM Erasmus University 
 
Michiel Wolfswinkel 
ENECO Energie NV and RSM Erasmus University 
 
 
 
 
January 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: Abe de Jong, Department of Financial Management, Room T9-53 P.O. 
Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Phone: +31 10 408 1022, Fax: +31 10 408 
9017, Email: ajong@rsm.nl. Opinions expressed in this article represent the authors’ strictly 
personal views and opinions and cannot in any way be construed as statements or views of 
ENECO Energie NV.  
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines acquirer wealth effects around acquisition announcements by Dutch firms. 
In the Netherlands the market for corporate control is virtually absent. Dutch firms can use 
several types of defense mechanisms as a protection against hostile takeovers and as a restriction 
of shareholders’ influence. As a result, shielded by defense mechanisms, Dutch managers can 
exercise more discretion in their corporate investment decisions than their counterparts in Anglo-
Saxon countries.  
 
Several studies examine acquirer wealth effects of US firms during the days around their 
acquisition announcements. The evidence of these studies is mixed. Some studies find zero or 
positive shareholder returns around acquisition announcements (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1990; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004, 2005; 
Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2006), whereas other studies find negative returns (e.g., Franks, Harris 
and Titman, 1991; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). When 
taking the change in dollar value into account, the results of Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2004, 2005) suggest that overall shareholders lose money. In the 1980s shareholders lost a total 
of $7 billion, while in the period 1991-2001 the loss amounts to $216 billion. Strikingly, in 1998-
2001 period dollar returns add up to a loss of $240 billion, which is mainly the result of a small 
number of large losses by firms with high market valuations. The acquisition literature knows a 
few studies on shareholder wealth effects of European acquiring firms. The studies on European 
acquisitions find on average positive shareholder returns for acquiring firms (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). 
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Even though several studies find on average positive returns around acquisition announcements, 
the percentage of shareholders experiencing negative returns is still high. A widely proposed 
explanation for the negative shareholder returns is agency problems as a result of the separation 
between ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers 
rather make non-value maximizing acquisitions to build their empire than pay out excess cash to 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In other words, by pursuing their own objectives and thereby 
increasing their own utility rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth, managers invest beyond 
the optimal size. A possible consequence of this overinvestment problem is that managers 
overpay for targets that provide private benefits (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990), such as 
entrenchment benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), which result in negative returns for the 
acquiring firm’s shareholders. In a recent contribution to the agency literature Jensen (2005) 
argues that managers may be motivated to acquire by high stock prices. Agency costs of 
overvalued equity arise in case managers make poor acquisitions in order to aim to fulfill 
unrealistic expectations of the stock market. 
 
Adequate corporate governance should diminish agency problems in acquisition decisions. One 
of the forces that discourage managers from empire building is the market for corporate control in 
the sense that firms making value-decreasing acquisitions are more likely to be acquired later 
(Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). However, takeover defenses decrease the probability of being taken 
over, which could lead to an insulation of managers from the discipline of the market for 
corporate control (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian, 2002; Field and Karpoff, 2002). Previous 
studies find takeover defenses to negatively influence firm value and long-run stock performance 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2005). Specifically, Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct a governance index, which is a score for the number of 
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takeover defenses and other anti-shareholder provisions out of a set of 24 provisions. The authors 
find firms with weaker shareholder rights have a lower firm value, make more acquisitions, are 
less profitable and have lower sales growth. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) refine this study 
by investigating which provisions from the governance index are the main drivers that negatively 
influence firm value. Their study suggests that just six out of the 24 provisions play a key role in 
explaining firm value. The six provisions consist of four provisions that limit shareholder voting 
power – i.e. staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority 
requirements for mergers and supermajority requirements for charter amendments – and two 
provisions that prevent hostile takeovers – i.e. poison pills and golden parachute arrangements. 
Although these studies contribute the negative relation to agency problems, they do not specify 
the reasons behind the negative impact. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2006) go one step further and 
examine the impact of takeover defenses of US firms on shareholder returns around acquisition 
announcements. They find that firms with more anti-takeover defenses exhibit lower shareholder 
returns around acquisition announcements relative to firms with less defenses. These findings 
suggest that managers, who are insulated from the market for corporate control by incorporating 
takeover defenses, are more likely to make non-value maximizing acquisition decisions. 
 
In this chapter, we describe the acquisition activity of Dutch industrial firms and the related 
wealth effects of the acquiring firms’ shareholders for the period from 1993 until 2004. We are 
especially interested in the impact of corporate governance on shareholders’ wealth changes 
following acquisition announcements by Dutch firms. As Dutch firms deploy several types of 
defense mechanisms (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997; De Jong, Kabir, Marra and Röell, 2001; 
De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley, 2005; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2006), managers can 
exercise more discretion with their acquisition decisions. In particular, firms that reach a certain 
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size are required to adopt the structured regime, as a result of which qualifying firms are obliged 
to set up a supervisory board. This supervisory board inherits many powers, which are otherwise 
held by shareholders. Apart from the structured regime, Dutch firms can introduce three types of 
securities that restrict shareholders’ influence on company decisions and act as defense 
mechanism against hostile takeovers. First, certificates through which holders have the same 
rights as holders of common shares with the exception of voting rights. Second, Dutch firms can 
install the option to sell preference shares to friendly shareholders during takeover threats, which 
is equivalent to US firms using poison pills as a takeover defense. Third, through priority shares, 
firms can provide friendly shareholders with special rights such as merger approval, new public 
offerings, nomination of board members, charter amendments and company liquidation. Corhay 
and Tourani Rad (2000) also examine abnormal returns of acquisition announcements disclosed 
by Dutch firms, however, focus exclusively on cross-border acquisitions. Besides, the authors do 
not relate corporate governance characteristics to acquirer’s returns. On the contrary, our study 
relates specific details of the corporate governance mechanisms of acquiring firms with 
shareholders’ wealth of these firms. We expect firms that are well governed to make value 
enhancing acquisition decisions. We also distinguish between deals in which shareholders 
experience large losses and deals without such large losses. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005) suggest that wealth destructing deals are more likely to take place when managerial 
discretion plays a larger role. The authors find firms with high valuations to be more likely to 
make losses of more than one billion dollar when announcing an acquisition. However, they do 
not provide direct evidence of the impact of corporate governance on the likelihood of these 
deals. We investigate whether good corporate governance mechanisms prevent firms from 
performing wealth-destructing acquisitions.  
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Our findings suggest a minor influence of corporate governance on acquisition announcements in 
the Netherlands. On average, acquirer returns are 1.1% and the average increase in shareholders’ 
wealth is €18 million. In explaining acquirer returns, we find just one governance variable to be 
statistically significant, i.e. the structured regime dummy. The regression coefficient suggests 
1.0% lower acquirer returns following acquisition announcements of firms that operate under the 
structured regime as compared to firms that do not operate under such a regime. This is in line 
with the notion that shareholders have limited power over firm’s decisions when these firms 
adopt a structured regime. We find the same striking result as Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005) that during 2001 and 2002 average acquirer percentage returns are positive, whereas the 
total euro wealth effect for shareholders is negative. Consequently, we investigate which firms 
are more likely to make wealth destructing deals. A binary logit analysis suggests that managers 
of firms that provide room for exercising discretion in their acquisition decisions are more likely 
to make deals in which shareholders lose more than €150 million. Specifically, a firm’s Tobin’s 
q, leverage and firm size increase the probability of making large losses during acquisition 
announcements. A higher likelihood of making value-destructing acquisitions of firms with more 
leverage may seem counterintuitive; however, managers of Dutch firms avoid the disciplining 
role of debt, especially when they overinvest (De Jong, 2002). Therefore, shareholders of firms 
with high leverage can perceive acquisition announcements as highly risky, which may bring 
about a stronger negative response resulting in large loss deals. In line with our expectations, a 
smaller relative size of the executive board and firms that have priority shares are more likely to 
make value-destructing acquisitions. However, preference shares decreases the likelihood of 
value-destructing acquisitions. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch situation and previous 
findings of factors that influence shareholders’ wealth effects. Subsequently, Section 3 discusses 
the research design. Section 4 describes the empirical results and we end the chapter by providing 
a conclusion in Section 5.  
2. Literature review 
This section first provides a description of the Dutch setting. Subsequently, we briefly discuss 
previous studies on the factors that influence shareholder returns around acquisition 
announcements.  
2.1. The Dutch situation 
The basis of Dutch corporate law is the shareholder-controlled firm with a management board 
and supervisory board. Shareholders’ rights consist of electing members of the management 
board and supervisory board, formally approving dividend policy and the annual accounts. 
Shareholders are also allowed to vote on major decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions. 
However, firms that are incorporated within the Netherlands are able to severely restrict the 
power of shareholders in four ways.1
 
Firms with a book value of shareholders’ equity of at least €11.4 million, with more than 100 
persons employed within the Netherlands and the legal obligation to set up a works council are 
required to adopt the structured regime. These firms are obliged to set up a supervisory board that 
takes over several powers from shareholders, including the authority over major decisions, the 
election of the management and supervisory board and the establishment and approval of annual 
accounts. It is important to note that shareholders retain their right to vote on mergers and 
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acquisitions. Multinationals with more than half of its employees abroad are exempted from the 
requirement of adopting a structured regime. However, they can operate under this regime on a 
voluntary basis which is applied by most multinationals.  
 
Apart from the structured regime, firms can implement three types of securities that restrict 
shareholders’ influence on company decisions and act as takeover defenses. First, Dutch firms 
can set up a trust office that holds the firm’s shares and issues certificates to the investors.  
Although certificate holders retain their dividend rights, they can freely trade their certificates 
and attend the General Meeting of Shareholders. However, they cannot vote. The trust office 
takes over all voting rights and is normally friendly to the incumbent managers. In practice, 
certificates enable managers to pursue their own objectives and provide a defense against firms 
that are willing to acquire the firm. Second, when firms experience a takeover threat, they can sell 
preference shares to friendly shareholders or a trust office. The main purpose of preference shares 
is to change the balance of power between shareholders as preference shares carry full voting 
rights, even though they may not be fully paid-up. The shareholders have to pay 25% of the 
nominal value upfront and the maximum amount of preference shares that can be issued is 50% 
or 100% of the current outstanding nominal capital. To be able to issue preference shares without 
shareholders’ consent, firms set up a trust office with an option on these shares. Third, Dutch 
firms may have priority shares that carry special rights, such as merger approval, new public 
offerings, nomination of board members, charter amendments and company liquidation, to 
friendly shareholders as takeover defense. As shareholders’ power with firms are severely 
restricted and Dutch firms widely implement these takeover defenses, the provisions of Euronext 
Amsterdam since 1989 allow firms to only use two types out of the latter three takeover defenses.  
 
 8
The use of these takeover defenses has implications for firm value. Consistent with previous 
research on takeover defenses, De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005) find all four 
takeover defense mechanisms to be negatively related to firm performance, measured by Tobin’s 
q. A possible reason for the lower Tobin’s q is the minor influence shareholders can exert on 
firms’ decisions. De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2004) provide evidence that the use of 
certificates, priority shares and the adoption of a structured regime decreases the probability that 
shareholders vote against proposals during General Meetings of Shareholders. On the other hand, 
their results show a positive relation between the use of preference shares and the probability of 
votes against proposals. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006) also show that shareholders of Dutch 
firms have a weak position, as they find that firms adopting the structured regime and firms that 
use preference shares relax their dividend policy.  
 
Other noticeable governance characteristics of Dutch firms include ownership structure, cross-
listings in the US and UK and the low disciplining impact of leverage. First, the ownership 
structure of Dutch firms is relatively concentrated (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997; De Jong, 
Kabir, Marra and Röell, 2001), while the voting rights in Dutch firms are more concentrated than 
ownership rights. This unequal distribution is due to the takeover mechanisms in which blocks of 
shares are controlled by trust offices (De Jong, Kabir, Marra and Röell, 2001). Furthermore, 
Dutch firms with a less concentrated ownership structure are more likely to adopt takeover 
defenses (Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink, 1997). Many Dutch firms have a cross-listing in the US, 
the UK or in both countries. In our sample, this holds for 32% of the firms. By means of a cross-
listing in one of these two countries, firms can bond themselves in terms of legal liability 
exposure and reputation (Coffee Jr, 1999, 2002). In other words, a cross-listing in the US or UK 
leaves less room for discretionary behavior (De Jong, Mertens and Van der Poel, 2006). Leverage 
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is another device to discipline managers to make value-maximizing decisions (Jensen, 1986). 
However, De Jong (2002) finds that this does not apply for managers of Dutch firms. The author 
provides evidence that in case managers are most likely to overinvest, they avoid the disciplining 
role of debt.  
2.2. Acquirer wealth effects around acquisition announcements  
As previously mentioned, studies on the shareholder wealth effects of acquiring firms directly 
around acquisition announcements provide mixed results. These wealth effects depend on firm 
and deal specific characteristics.  
 
According to Jensen (1986), managers rather make non value-maximizing acquisitions than pay 
out excess cash to shareholders. In line with this overinvestment hypothesis, Lang, Stulz and 
Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) show that acquisitions by firms with a low Tobin’s q 
negatively influence shareholders’ wealth. Besides, as firms with a low Tobin’s q are not likely to 
have positive net present value projects, the probability that managers of these firms make non 
value-maximizing acquisitions increases when having enough free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). 
Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this theory. 
Bidders with a high Tobin’s q increase shareholders’ wealth when acquiring low q targets (Lang, 
Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991). These studies interpret high q firms as well managed 
firms that acquire poorly managed firms (i.e. low q firms).  
 
A recent theory by Jensen (2005) is based on observed acquisition behavior of highly valued 
firms (i.e. high q firms). In these firms agency problems due to overvalued equity bring about 
more managerial discretion, increasing the probability of bad acquisitions when firms have run 
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out of good ones. Jensen’s argument is that in case the stock market attaches unrealistic high 
stock prices to firms, managers will under normal business practice not be able to deliver the 
performance implies by the pricing. This leads to ‘managerial heroin’, i.e. using the overvalued 
equity to make long run value-destroying acquisitions. 
  
According to financial economic theory, the disciplining role of leverage has a positive impact on 
the acquirer returns (Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell, 1993). Debt serves as a monitoring 
device, providing less leeway for managers in making acquisition decisions (Jensen, 1986). 
Hence, leverage increases the probability of value enhancing acquisitions. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that firm size is negatively associated with shareholder 
returns of acquisition announcements. The authors relate the size effect with the difference of 
deal (e.g. equity/cash payment, private/public target) and firm characteristics (e.g. Tobin’s q and 
leverage) between small and large firms.  
 
In terms of deal characteristics, previous studies find that US firms that fully finance their 
acquisitions with cash experience higher abnormal returns than equity financed deals (e.g., 
Servaes, 1991; Franks, Harris and Titman, 1991; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). 
Acquiring firms finance with equity to force target shareholders in sharing the risk that the price 
for the target was too high (Hansen, 1987). An alternative explanation is that the acquiring firms 
are overvalued and aim to decrease their overvaluation by acquiring less overvalued targets with 
cheap equity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show 
opposite results for European firms. Acquirer returns of European firms that pay with equity are 
higher than that of European firms that pay with cash. The returns for both payment methods are 
significantly positive. A possible explanation for this opposite result is that European firms 
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acquire private firms more often, which is in line with US evidence that equity payments with the 
acquisition of private firms yield positive abnormal returns, whereas equity payments with the 
acquisition of public firms yield negative abnormal returns (Chang, 1998; Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz, 2004). Overall, firms experience a positive shareholders’ reaction in case they 
announce an acquisition of a private firm and a negative shareholders’ reaction in case of a public 
firm in both the US and in Europe (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2006).  
 
More diversified firms trade at a discount, due to amongst others inefficient investment and 
cross-subsidization (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and 
Stein, 2000). As a result, diversifying acquisitions negatively contribute to shareholders’ wealth. 
This negative impact applies to US firms (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990), European firms 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2006) and, more specifically, to Dutch firms (Corhay and Tourani 
Rad, 2000). Global diversification seems to have a similar impact on acquisitions as industrial 
diversification. In particular, the excess value of more globally diversified firms is smaller than 
less globally diversified firms (Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002). Besides, cross-border acquisitions 
provides lower abnormal returns than domestic acquisitions in the US (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). The impact of cross-border deals by European firms provides mixed 
results. Consistent with results for US firms, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) find larger 
acquirer returns for domestic acquisition announcements relative to cross-border announcements 
for a sample of 2,419 European acquisitions. However, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) examine 
the returns of 228 acquisitions with a value of at least 100 million dollars and find the opposite 
result. The latter results are mainly driven by UK acquirers. In contrast to Continental Europe, the 
UK knows a highly active market for corporate control and has a high degree of shareholder 
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protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Corhay and Tourani Rad 
(2000) examine cross-border acquisitions by Dutch firms and find small average positive 
abnormal returns for acquisitions in Western Europe (1.44% for 11 days around the 
announcement) and the US (0.25% for 5 days after the announcement and 4.83% for 91 days 
around the announcement), but no significant abnormal returns for acquisitions in Eastern 
Europe.  
3. Research design 
This section first discusses the data selection procedure, followed by a description of variables 
that we use for the analysis. Finally, we will describe our empirical models. 
3.1. Dataset 
Our data collection starts with all Dutch exchange-listed firms over the period 1993-2004. We 
focus on industrial firms, i.e. we exclude financial and service companies. In total, we study the 
acquisition announcements of 90 firms. For each firm we search the electronic version of the 
Dutch financial daily, Het Financieele Dagblad. We retrieve all newspaper articles with the 
company names in the title or the body of the text and manually identify articles with the initial 
announcements of acquisitions. In total, we include 865 acquisition announcements by 64 firms. 
 
For the 64 firms (in 312 firm years) we collect financial and corporate governance characteristics 
from several sources. We obtain stock and index returns from Datastream. Financial data is 
obtained from the REACH database (Review and Analysis of Companies in Holland by Bureau 
Van Dijk) and Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen. Board and ownership data is taken from the 
Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen, Jaarboek Nederlandse Ondernemingen and yearly 
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overviews of WMZ notifications in Het Financieele Dagblad.2 Takeover defenses and cross-
listings are taken from the Effectengids, a yearly guide with all exchange-listed securities in 
Amsterdam. The information on the application of the structured regime is obtained from the 
Monitoring Report 1997 and firm’s annual reports. In order for a firm-year to be included we 
require that data is available for all items. 
3.2. Variables definition 
This section defines the firm and deal variables that we use in our empirical analysis. The Tobin’s 
q is the market value of the firm divided by the replacement value of the assets as calculated in 
De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005). In the Netherlands, firms base the value of their 
assets either on its replacement value or on its historical costs. In case of the replacement value, 
no change was necessary. In case of historical costs, we adjust this value towards its replacement 
value. We measure free cash flow similar to Lehn and Poulsen (1989), i.e. operating income 
before depreciation minus total income taxes plus deferred taxes from the previous year to the 
current year minus gross interest expense on debt minus dividends paid divided by book value of 
total assets. The return on assets is calculated as the firm’s operating profits standardized by the 
book value of total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by the book value of total assets and 
firm size is the natural log of a firm’s book value of total assets. The relative size of the board is 
the number of executive board members divided by the total number of board members (i.e. both 
executive and supervisory board members). The percentage of block shareholdings is the 
percentage of shares held in a block outside the firm. A blockholding is defined as a stake of at 
least 5%. Insider ownership is the percentage blockholdings by insiders, supervisory and 
executive board members. We define a dummy that takes on the value of one for firms with a 
cross-listing in the US or the UK, and zero otherwise. To control for takeover defenses, we define 
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four dummy variables that take on the value of one if the firm has preference shares, if the firm 
has priority shares, if the firm has certificates and if the firm operates under the restricted regime. 
To examine the overall impact of takeover defenses, we also define a takeover defense index, 
which aggregates all four takeover defense dummies.  
 
In terms of the deal characteristics, we construct a dummy for deals in which firms use equity in 
their payments. Note that mixed payments (i.e. both cash and equity) are also included in this 
dummy. Furthermore, we define a dummy for observations in which we know that the target is 
listed. Acquisitions are classified as diversifying and focus shifting, based on the description of 
the announcement in the newspaper. The relative size of the acquisition is calculated twofold. If 
firms disclose the transaction value, we calculate the relative size as the transaction value divided 
by the market capitalization of the acquirer. However, if the transaction value is not available, the 
relative size is the ratio of target sales to acquirer sales.  
3.3. Market reaction model 
We measure the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around acquisition 
announcements using the abnormal returns generated by a market model as described by 
MacKinlay (1997). Our estimation window runs from day -120 to day -20. We aggregate the 
abnormal returns over a period of five days, starting two days prior to the acquisition 
announcement until two days after the acquisition announcement. Apart from the percentage 
returns, we also calculate the euro wealth effects by multiplying the five days CAR by the 
beginning of the year’s market value of the acquirer’s equity.  
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Next, we investigate the determinants of the aggregated acquirer returns by means of an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression in which we explain the five days CAR by the acquirer Tobin’s q, 
free cash flows, return on assets, leverage, ln(size), a dummy for equity payment, a dummy for 
listed target, a dummy for diversifying acquisition, a dummy for domestic target, a dummy for 
European target, a dummy for US target, relative size of the acquisition, relative size of the 
executive board, block shareholders, insider ownership, a dummy for cross-listing US/UK, a 
dummy for priority shares, a dummy for preference shares, a dummy for certificates and a 
dummy for restricted regime. The model incorporates year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects, based on five major industry groups according to two-digit SIC industry codes. All 
regression p-values are based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  
3.4. Wealth destructing deals model 
We classify acquisitions as wealth destructing if shareholders lose more than 150 million euros 
during the acquisition announcement. To investigate what type of firms make wealth destructing 
acquisition announcements, we estimate the following binary logit regression, in which we 
explain whether the deal is wealth destructing by the acquirer Tobin’s q, free cash flows, return 
on assets, leverage, ln(size), a dummy for equity payment, a dummy for listed target, a dummy 
for diversifying acquisition, a dummy for domestic target, a dummy for European target, a 
dummy for US target, relative size of the acquisition, relative size of the executive board, block 
shareholders, insider ownership, a dummy for cross-listing US/UK, a dummy for priority shares, 
a dummy for preference shares, a dummy for certificates and a dummy for restricted regime. The 
model incorporates year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, based on five major industry 
groups according to two-digit SIC industry codes. All regression p-values are based on 
Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.  
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4. Results 
This section first provides a description of the sample. Statistics of firm and deal variables and 
the features of shareholders’ wealth change around acquisition announcements will be discussed. 
Subsequently, we examine the factors that influence shareholders’ wealth change and conclude 
with an analysis of deals with which shareholders lose more than €150 million.  
4.1. Sample description 
As previously mentioned, our dataset consists of 312 firm years in which 64 firms announce 865 
acquisitions. Table 1 panel A shows more detailed information about the characteristics of these 
firm years.  
 
- Insert Table 1 about here – 
 
Our sample represents the larger industrial firms within the Netherlands, with an average market 
capitalization of 3.08 billion euros. They show good performance, as the average return on assets 
is 33.6% and the average Tobin’s q is 1.548. However, the return on assets exhibits a large 
variation across the sample as its standard deviation is relatively high. The mean free cash flow is 
positive, indicating that firms are able to spend internal funds on additional investments. With an 
average of 27.9%, the leverage of Dutch firms is low as compared to US firms. In terms of 
corporate governance, the board consists for 63.8% of executives. Specifically, the median 
number of executive board members is six, whereas the median number of supervisory board 
members is just three. The data on blockholders confirm the concentrated ownership structure 
within the Netherlands. The largest outside blockholder owns on average 17% of the firm. Taking 
into account all blockholders, the average ownership is 29.1%. Although the median percentage 
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insider ownership is zero, the average is 5.8%. Furthermore, 31.7% of the sample firms have a 
cross-listing in the US and or in the UK, suggesting that managers of these firms exercise less 
discretion in their decisions (De Jong, Mertens and Van der Poel, 2006). Takeover defense 
mechanisms in the Netherlands severely restrict shareholders’ power within the firm. Consistent 
with previous studies about the Dutch governance situation, the results indicate that Dutch firms 
widely implement takeover defenses in terms of priority shares (43.3%), preferred shares 
(67.3%), certificates (37.2%) and the adoption of the structured regime (67.9%). Aggregating all 
takeover defenses within a firm, the median Dutch firm adopts two out of the four mechanisms.  
 
Panel B of Table 1 provides the deal characteristics of our sample. Firms release the transaction 
value of their deals only 152 out of the 865 times. These 152 deals show an average transaction 
value of 521 million euros. The median is only one sixth of the average value, which implies that 
the dataset includes some very large deals. Besides, the transaction value varies considerably as 
the standard deviation is relatively high. This also applies for the transaction value relative to the 
acquiring firm’s market capitalization and the ratio of target to acquirer sales. The results also 
show that Dutch firms acquire public firms in 7.2% of all acquisitions. Compared to the sample 
of European firms in Martynova and Renneboog (2006), in which 36.8% of all acquisitions 
concern listed targets, this percentage is rather low. Furthermore, firms announce a diversifying 
deal in 20.5% of the sample and a shift in focus in 4.9% of the sample. The high percentage of 
diversifying acquisition announcements is remarkable, as previous studies find diversifying 
acquisitions to be value-decreasing (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Corhay and Tourani Rad, 
2000; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). Firms finance their target with a combination of cash 
and equity in 3.6% of our sample. In 5.9% of the acquisitions, firms announce to pay with equity. 
Note that this percentage also includes the mixed payments. The low percentage may be caused 
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by the low amount of listed target firms. In 19.1% of the acquisitions, firms announce to finance 
their deal with cash. In all other cases, firms do not disclose how they finance their target. In line 
with Corhay and Tourani Rad (2000), Dutch firms know a strong international orientation. They 
make domestic acquisitions only in 24% of all sample deals, whereas in 44.5% of the deals the 
target comes from another European country and in 19.2% of the deals the target is located in the 
US.3  
 
To get an impression about the shareholders’ wealth effects around acquisition announcements, 
Table 2 provides statistics of the percentage abnormal returns (panel A) and the euro wealth 
transfers (panel B) for different event windows.  
 
- Insert Table 2 about here – 
 
Panel A of the table shows significantly positive abnormal returns around acquisition 
announcements for four out of the six event periods, indicating that acquisitions in the 
Netherlands on average enhance shareholder wealth. During the five days around the acquisition 
announcement, shareholders experience a significant increase of 1.07% in their returns. The share 
price does not experience a significant change from 20 days until 3 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement and 3 days until 20 days after the announcement, suggesting that the information 
about the acquisition is discounted into the market price immediately around the release of the 
information.  
 
Panel B provides the abnormal euro returns around acquisition announcements. Shareholders 
experience an average significant increase in their wealth of €17.89 million during the five days 
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around an acquisition announcement. Wealth changes in the other event windows are not 
significantly different from zero. Note that the standard deviation of the euro returns are 
extremely large, suggesting both large gains and losses for shareholders of acquiring firms. The 
extreme values provide support for this suggestion. For instance, the minimum value for the five 
days window indicates a loss of about €2.7 billion and the maximum value indicates a gain of 
about €1.8 billion. The extreme values of the other event windows are even larger.  
 
As Table 2 suggests that most of the announcement returns occur during the five days around the 
acquisition announcement, Figure 1 provides the average development of the share price over the 
forty days around the announcement and Figure 2 shows the distribution of the cumulative 
abnormal returns over the five days event window.  
 
- Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here – 
 
Figure 1 shows a slight price run-up prior to the acquisition announcement, which does not differ 
significantly from zero. The sharp increase in average abnormal returns starts at two days prior to 
the announcement day and lasts for about five days. Afterwards, the cumulative abnormal returns 
remain relatively stable around the 1.2%. Figure 2 shows that the distribution of the cumulative 
abnormal returns appears to be normally distributed. Besides, acquisition announcements are 
more often value increasing than value decreasing. The results further show that the distribution 
of abnormal returns is somewhat skewed towards positive returns. 
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When disclosing a planned acquisition, firms usually provide reasons why they take over another 
firm. As the motivation behind acquisitions is important information for the market, table 3 lists 
the stated motivations, the frequency of these motivations and the related acquirer returns.  
 
- Insert Table 3 about here – 
 
We categorize the motives into seven groups; 1) cost reduction, 2) geographic expansion, 3) 
broadening the firm’s product line, 4) increasing the firm’s market share, 5) diversification, 6) 
another motive, which do not belong to the first five groups, and 7) no motive provided. The 
most common motives are an increase in market share that occurs in 37% of all announcements 
and geographic expansion that occurs in 17% of all announcements. Both motives yield 
significantly positive abnormal returns (1.21% and 1.19%, respectively), indicating that these 
types of acquisitions are value enhancing for shareholders. The acquisitions in which firms can 
reduce their costs in the form of economies of scale or access to low wage labor also provides 
positive abnormal returns (1.32%). A remarkable result is that shareholders respond positively to 
diversifying reasons, while previous studies find diversifying acquisitions to be negatively related 
with the market reaction. The abnormal returns are 1.56%, which is the highest percentage 
compared to all other reasons. Note that in 3% of all acquisition announcements, firms state that 
the prime motive to acquire a firm is to diversify, whereas 20.5% of all acquisitions are 
diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore, firms do not provide a motive for their acquisition in 27% 
of the sample, yet the abnormal returns are significantly positive. The data do not show a 
significant response to firms that aim to broaden their product line or give another motive. The 
main conclusion from Table 3 is that the stated motive does seem to explain the acquirer’s wealth 
change, as shareholders respond significantly to some of the stated motives and not to others.  
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 The market response and total wealth effects around acquisitions depend on the period in which 
the acquisition takes place (Harford, 2005; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005). In particular, 
the abnormal returns are higher at the beginning of merger waves than later during the merger 
wave. Table 4 presents the percentage abnormal returns and the euro wealth effects per year. A 
more visual overview can be drawn from Figure 3.  
 
- Insert Table 4 and Figure 3 about here – 
 
The results indicate that during the first half of the nineties, several value decreasing acquisitions 
take place. Though not statistically significant, the years 1994 and 1995 show zero and small 
negative abnormal returns and large negative wealth effects for the shareholders. During these 
years, the least amount of positive reactions to acquisition announcements occur. Afterwards, 
shareholders experience an increase in their wealth, with 1999 as most successful year. In that 
year, the total wealth gain due to acquisition announcements is €7.7 billion and the average 
abnormal return is 2.2%. The economic downturn started halfway 2000. The consequences of this 
downturn appear in 2001, which shows a decrease in the number of acquisitions. The total wealth 
losses are €660.2 million and €4.7 million in the year after. Strikingly, the average abnormal 
returns are positive during these years. These results suggest that, consistent with Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004, 2005), the negative wealth effects are a result of a few extremely 
large losses. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) argue that managers of highly valued firms 
can exercise more discretion and hence, are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. 
Firm size can also drive the results (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). Acquisitions by 
small firms are generally value enhancing, but the euro gains are small as well. On the contrary, 
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larger firms make larger acquisitions that can result in large euro losses. Both effects together can 
result in positive returns and negative wealth effects at the same time. In Section 4.3, we examine 
the value-destructing deals into more detail. Finally, in the last two years of our sample the 
number of acquisitions is still low, yet the acquisition announcements that take place do yield 
positive abnormal returns.  
4.2. Explaining wealth effects 
So far, we discussed the characteristics and abnormal returns of our sample of acquisition 
announcements by means of a univariate analysis. This section discusses the factors that 
influence shareholders’ wealth around an acquisition announcement. Table 5 shows the results of 
four ordinary least squares regressions with the five days abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable.  
 
- Insert Table 5 about here – 
 
Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), the first regression indicates that larger 
firms are more likely to make value reducing acquisitions. Furthermore, firms that finance their 
deal with equity experience 2.2% higher abnormal returns than firms that do not use equity as 
payment. Although this result is not in line with previous research on US firms, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) find similar results for European firms. A possible explanation for the positive 
relation is the high amount of private targets that get acquired. The results further show that the 
target’s country of origin does not influence shareholders’ wealth. None of the country dummies 
is significant. Firm and deal characteristics that do not influence acquirer returns are the firm’s 
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Tobin’s q, free cash flow, return on assets, leverage, whether the target is listed and whether the 
deal is diversifying. 
 
The size of the target relative to the acquirer firm size is an indication for the impact of the deal 
for the acquiring firm. Unfortunately, few firms disclose the price they pay for the target (152 out 
of 865) and we do not know the target sales of all deals (555). To examine the impact of the deal 
size, we construct the variable ‘relative size of acquisition’ in which we set the value to the 
relative price paid, calculated as price paid for the target divided by the market value of the 
acquirer firm’s equity. If this value is not available, we take the ratio of target sales to acquirer 
sales. Regression 2 of Table 5 includes the relative size of the acquisition. We find the relative 
size to be positively related with acquirer returns, suggesting that larger acquisitions are more 
likely to be firm value enhancing. Another effect of including this relative size is that the equity 
payment dummy loses its significance, which may a result of the smaller sample size. However, 
when running regression 1 with the same observations as regression 2 (results are not tabulated), 
the equity payment dummy remains significant, implying that the dummy is an artifact of the 
relative size of an acquisition. Firms that acquire relatively large targets are more likely not to 
have enough cash available, increasing the probability to pay with equity. A comparison between 
the R-squared of regression 1 (with 644 observations) and regression 2 implies a significant 
increase in explanatory power (p=0.000).  
 
To examine the impact of corporate governance on shareholders’ wealth around acquisition 
announcements, Regression 3 includes the variables relative size of the board, percentage of 
block shareholders, percentage insider ownership, a dummy for being cross-listed in the US or 
UK and the takeover defense index. We expect a better governance structure within a firm to 
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bring about less discretion for managers, resulting in higher abnormal returns. The results suggest 
a marginal impact of corporate governance on firm’s decisions as only the coefficient for 
takeover defense index is significant. In line with Masulis, Wang and Xie (2006) and in line with 
our expectations, the coefficient is negative. Ceteris paribus, for each implemented takeover 
defense mechanism, shareholders’ wealth decreases with 0.4%. To investigate which of the 
takeover defense mechanisms drive the negative effect, we include the four defense dummies in 
regression 4. The restricted regime dummy appears to mainly drive the takeover defense effect. 
In particular, the abnormal returns around acquisition announcements are 1.0% lower for firms 
that have adopted a structured regime as compared to firms that have not adopted such a regime. 
Comparing the 1.0% with the average of 1.07% abnormal returns for the whole sample, the 
impact of a structured regime is high.  
4.3. Which firms make wealth-destructing deals? 
As previously mentioned, our results suggest that a small number of acquisitions drive down the 
total shareholders’ wealth around acquisition announcements. In this section, we investigate 
whether firm and deal characteristics differ for wealth-destructing deals versus non-wealth 
destructing deals. In particular, we expect these wealth-destructing deals to occur in firms where 
managers are able to exercise discretion and make acquisitions that maximize their own utility. 
Corporate governance should prevent managers from making large loss deals. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) examine wealth-destructing deals with a loss of at least $1 billion 
disclosed by US firms. We focus on deals with losses of more than €150 million, because our 
sample exclusively consists of Dutch firms that are on average smaller than US firms and we aim 
to construct a sample that is large enough to draw robust conclusions.4 From our sample of 865 
acquisition announcements, 80 acquisitions announced by 9 firms are wealth-destructing. The 
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total wealth destruction of these 80 acquisition announcements is €38 billion. Table 6 presents 
descriptives and mean comparisons of the sample with and without these wealth-destructing 
deals. 
 
- Insert Table 6 about here – 
 
Panel A provides the firm characteristics. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005), firms that make value-destroying acquisitions are larger (market capitalization of €12.0 
billion vs. €1.5 billion) and have a higher Tobin’s q (2.067 vs. 1.459). The higher Tobin’s q is in 
line with the arguments that a high valuation of firms increases the likelihood of managers to act 
in their own interest (Jensen, 2005; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005). According to 
Jensen (1986), managers in firms with excess free cash flows are more likely to make value 
reducing acquisitions. However, this theory does not apply to wealth-destructing acquisitions, as 
firm years in which wealth-destructing acquisitions occur do not have significantly more free 
cash flows. Governance characteristics also provide some significant results. Although both the 
supervisory board and the executive board are larger in firms with wealth-destructing deals, the 
relative size of the executive board is smaller (60.4% versus 64.4%). The smaller relative number 
of executives in the board implies better monitoring and therefore a lower probability to make 
large losses. Moreover, the percentage of outside blockholders that are other monitoring agents is 
lower within firm years with wealth-destructing deals (20.7% vs. 30.5%). Insider ownership 
should increase the incentives of managers to act firm value maximizing and hence not to make 
large losses around acquisition announcements. Insider ownership of 1.1% for firm years with 
wealth-destructing acquisitions and of 6.6% for firm years without such deals is evidence that is 
consistent with this line of reasoning. A remarkable result is that firms making wealth-destructing 
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deals are more often cross-listed in the US and/or the UK (73.9% vs. 24.4%). A cross-listing is 
amongst others a bonding mechanism for managers to act value-maximizing (Coffee Jr., 1999, 
2002), however, the results suggest the opposite. An alternative explanation comes from the fact 
that Dutch firms with a cross-listing in the US and/or UK are typically larger. The significant 
difference may be an artifact of firm size. Another surprising result is the lower amount of 
takeover defense mechanisms in firm years with value-destructing deals (1.8 vs. 2.2). 
Distinguishing between the different takeover defense mechanisms gives 21.7% of all firm years 
with wealth-destructing acquisitions have certificates, 39.1% have adopted the structured regime, 
58.7% have preference shares and 65.2% have priority shares. For firm years without the wealth-
destructing deals, these percentages are 39.8%, 72.9%, 68.8% and 39.5%, respectively. 
Therefore, only the relatively high application of priority shares for firm years with wealth-
destructing deals as compared to firms without such deals meets our expectations.  
 
Panel B provides the differences in deal characteristics between wealth-destructing deals and non 
wealth-destructing deals. As wealth-destructing deals have a large impact on the euro value of 
firms, we expect the transaction value for these deals to be larger as well. The table shows a 
higher transaction value for value-destructing deals, yet the difference is not statistically 
significant. This also applies for the transaction value standardized by the market value of equity 
of the acquirer. Unexpectedly, the ratio of target sales to acquirer sales, which is also a proxy for 
the size of the deal, is smaller for value-destroying deals (3.8% vs. 9.9%). Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2005) suggest that the absolute change of returns around acquisition announcements 
reflect both the net present value of the acquisition itself and the information that is revealed 
about the firm by announcing an acquisition. The large loss deals may be a reflection of the 
information about the firm beyond the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, targets of value-
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destructing deals are more often listed (15% vs. 6.4%) and located in the US (30% vs. 18.1%). In 
contrast to Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), we find less equity payments in wealth-
destructing deals. In particular, 1.3% of the wealth-destructing deals are financed with equity, 
whereas this is 6.4% for non wealth-destructing deals (this is 0% vs. 3.9% for mixed payment 
methods).  
 
Now that we know the characteristics of firms announcing wealth-destructing deals and the 
characteristics of such a deal itself, we aim to predict the likelihood that a wealth-destructing 
acquisition occurs. In a logit regression with exclusively a dummy for the firm being in its 
highest valuation year, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) find that firms make wealth 
destructing deals when their valuation is high. This result is consistent with the arguments of 
Jensen (2005), who reasons that a high valuation of firms increases the likelihood of managers to 
act in their own interest. Apart from the Tobin’s q, we include additional firm, governance and 
deal variables in the regression in which the dependent variable that takes on the value of one if 
the deal is value-destructing and zero otherwise. We are particularly interested in whether good 
corporate governance structures provide more protection for shareholders. 
 
- Insert Table 7 about here – 
 
With a McFadden R-squared of 35.68%, the model can reasonably predict the likelihood that 
firms make value-destructing acquisitions. The significantly positive Tobin’s q is in line with the 
theory that managers of highly valued firms are more likely to make value decreasing decisions. 
Leverage shows a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that firms with more leverage are 
more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions in spite of the fact that leverage acts as a 
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monitoring device (Jensen, 1986). As De Jong (2002) argues that Dutch managers are not 
disciplined by leverage, shareholders can perceive acquisition announcements of firms with high 
leverage as highly risky and hence respond negatively to the announcement. Furthermore, larger 
firms are also more likely to make wealth-destructing deals. This result is consistent with 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), who find a size effect in explaining acquirer returns 
around acquisition announcements. As larger firms make larger deals, they are also more likely to 
make larger losses. The governance variables suggest that the relative size of the board, priority 
shares and preference shares influence the likelihood of a wealth-destructing deal. In line with 
our expectations, a larger proportion of executives on the board give the executives more 
possibilities to exercise discretion, increasing the probability to make value-destroying 
acquisitions. Furthermore, firms with priority shares, providing friendly shareholders with special 
rights such as merger approval, are better protected against takeover defenses and therefore more 
likely to make wealth-destructing deals. On the other hand, preference shares, another takeover 
defense mechanism, negatively influence the probability of wealth-destructing acquisitions. The 
other governance variables – i.e. block shareholders, insider ownership, being cross-listed in the 
US or UK, certificates and structured regime – do not show a significant impact. Free cash flows, 
return on assets and none of the deal characteristics influence the probability of value-destructing 
deals either. In sum, the significant coefficients of firms’ Tobin’s q, leverage and size imply that 
managers exercise discretion in their acquisition decisions resulting in a higher probability of 
making wealth-destructing acquisitions. Corporate governance does have an effect on acquirer 
wealth gains in acquisitions; however, the results suggest a rather minor effect.  
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter provides an extensive description of the acquisition market within the Netherlands 
for the period starting in 1993 until 2004. We investigate the change in shareholders’ wealth 
during the days around acquisition announcements and the impact of a firm’s governance 
structure on shareholders’ wealth change. From an international perspective, the Netherlands 
provides an interesting setting, as the market for corporate control is virtually absent. Dutch firms 
can implement four types of defense mechanisms – priority shares, preference shares, certificates, 
adoption of structured regime – that severely restrict shareholders’ power. Limited shareholder 
power leaves much room for managers to exercise discretion in their acquisition decisions. We 
examine shareholders’ wealth change in terms of the percentage abnormal returns and the 
absolute euro change.  
 
We investigate a sample of 865 acquisitions in the period 1993-2004 and find that, even though 
shareholders have limited power, their average wealth increases around acquisition 
announcements. We also find that an adequate corporate governance structure has a minor 
influence on acquisition announcements. In explaining acquirer returns, only one governance 
factor provides significant results. Specifically, firms that adopt the structured regime have lower 
acquirer returns, which is in line with managers exercising discretion when shareholders’ power 
is low.  
 
In addition to returns expressed as the corrected percentage stock price change, we also measure 
the changes in the market values of the firm’s equity in euros. We find the same striking result as 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) that during 2001 and 2002 average acquirer returns are 
positive, whereas the total euro wealth effect for shareholders is negative. In order to shed light 
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on this counter-intuitive finding, we examine which firms are more likely to announce deals that 
result in a wealth loss of more than €150 million. Our results indicate that high q firms, firms 
with high leverage and larger firms are more likely to make value-destructing acquisitions. The 
finding that high q firms are dominantly present among the group of wealth destructing 
companies is in line with Jensen’s (2005) prediction of agency problems resulting from 
overvalued equity. The positive impact of leverage on the likelihood of managers to announce 
value-destructing deals is in line with the results of De Jong (2002), who finds Dutch managers to 
avoid the disciplining role of leverage, especially when they overinvest. Once more, the results 
on explaining the likelihood of wealth destructing deals suggest a minor impact of corporate 
governance. A smaller relative amount of executive board members and firms that do not have 
priority shares decrease the likelihood of value-destructing acquisitions.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of acquirer and deal characteristics 
The table presents the means, medians, standard deviations and the number of observations of firm and deal 
variables. The market capitalization is the beginning of the year market value of equity. The return on assets is 
calculated as operating profits standardized by book value of total assets. We measure the Tobin’s q as the ratio of a 
firm’s market value to replacement value of assets as calculated in De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005). 
We calculate free cash flow as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989). Leverage is total debt divided by book value of total 
assets. The relative size of the board is the number of executive board members divided by total number of board 
members. The takeover index is the aggregate value of all four takeover defense dummies (i.e. priority shares, 
preference shares, certificates and structured regime). The transaction value is the amount paid for the target.  
Panel A: Acquirer characteristics at a firm year level
 Mean Median St.dev. N
Financial characteristics
Market capitalization (€ thousands) 3,081,620 593,857 7,776,843 312
Return on assets 0.336 0.108 3.737 312
Tobin's q 1.548 1.344 0.769 312
Free cash flow/total assets 0.032 0.034 0.035 312
Leverage 0.279 0.245 0.188 312
Governance characteristics
Number of supervisory board members 3.510 3.000 1.645 312
Number of executive board members 6.048 6.000 2.205 312
Relative size of executive board 0.638 0.636 0.108 312
Percentage largest outside blockholder 0.170 0.090 0.182 312
Total percentage outside blockholders 0.291 0.225 0.237 312
Total percentage inside blockholders 0.058 0.000 0.141 312
Dummy cross listing US and/or UK 0.317 0.000 0.466 312
Takeover defense index 2.157 2.000 1.007 312
Dummy priority shares 0.433 0.000 0.496 312
Dummy preference shares 0.673 1.000 0.470 312
Dummy certificates 0.372 0.000 0.484 312
Dummy structured regime 0.679 1.000 0.467 312
Panel B: Deal characteristics at a deal level
 Mean Median St.dev. N
Transaction value (€ thousands) 520,761 90,756 1,201,059 152
Transaction value/market capitalization 0.136 0.031 0.255 152
Sales target/sales acquirer 0.094 0.015 0.291 555
Dummy listed target 0.072 0.000 0.259 865
Dummy diversifying acquisition 0.205 0.000 0.404 865
Dummy focus shifting acquisition 0.049 0.000 0.215 865
Dummy payment in cash and equity 0.036 0.000 0.186 865
Dummy payment in equity 0.059 0.000 0.236 865
Dummy payment in cash 0.191 0.000 0.393 865
Dummy domestic acquisition 0.240 0.000 0.428 865
Dummy European acquisition (excluding NL) 0.445 0.000 0.497 865
Dummy US acquisition 0.192 0.000 0.394 865
all deals
all deals
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Table 2: Acquirer returns around acquisition announcements for different event windows 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the percentage abnormal returns and the wealth transfer in millions of 
euros for different event windows. The acquisition announcement day is day zero. Abnormal returns are calculated 
by using the market model as described in MacKinlay (1997), with the estimation window running from day -120 to 
day -20. We aggregate the abnormal returns for the different event windows. The euro wealth transfer is the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the event window times the acquirer’s market capitalization at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. The table shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A: Descriptives of the market reaction to acquisition announcements for different event windows
[-20, 20] [-10, 10] [-5, 5] [-2,2] [-20,-3] [3,20]
Mean 1.30% *** 0.96% *** 1.13% *** 1.07% *** 0.08% 0.15%
Minimum -55.76% -68.33% -36.09% -22.48% -66.47% -39.07%
25% -6.16% -3.97% -2.63% -1.45% -4.31% -3.85%
Median 1.00% 0.45% 0.54% 0.61% -0.16% -0.15%
75% 7.29% 5.40% 4.43% 3.31% 4.37% 4.16%
Maximum 68.22% 71.17% 40.39% 39.27% 32.57% 50.23%
Standard deviation 12.42% 9.04% 6.78% 4.95% 7.86% 7.69%
N 865 865 865 865 865 865
 
Panel B: Descriptives of the wealth transfer in € millions around acquisition announcements for different event windows
[-20, 20] [-10, 10] [-5, 5] [-2,2] [-20,-3] [3,20]
Mean 23.04 1.89 6.57 17.89 * -28.70 33.84
Minimum -9,040.49 -6,377.08 -5,144.17 -2,726.24 -6,545.32 -3,646.44
25% -66.75 -55.36 -41.87 -20.13 -51.37 -54.05
Median 3.05 1.49 1.49 2.22 -0.37 -0.42
75% 87.75 52.87 51.62 37.06 53.80 47.92
Maximum 16,146.15 9,302.80 3,717.78 1,790.41 7,199.73 11,871.74
Standard deviation 1,033.73 665.18 482.74 294.73 673.89 839.78
N 865 865 865 865 865 865
Event window
Event window
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Table 3: Stated motives for acquisitions and the related abnormal returns 
This table presents the frequency of acquirers’ motives for the acquisition as disclosed in their acquisition 
announcements. Cost reduction consists of economies of scale, synergy, efficiency and access to low wage labor. 
The table also provides the average cumulative abnormal returns over five days surrounding the acquisition 
announcements per stated motive. The table shows *, ** and *** for CAR values that are significantly different from 
zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Stated motives for acquisitions Number Percentage CAR
Cost reduction 60 7% 1.32% *
Geographic expansion 150 17% 1.19% ***
Broadening product line 61 7% 0.93%
Increasing market share 321 37% 1.21% ***
Diversification/vertical integration 22 3% 1.56% *
Other motive 19 2% 0.86%
No motive 232 27% 0.74% **
Total 865 100% 1.07% ***  
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Table 4: The characteristics of shareholders’ wealth effects per year 
The table shows descriptives of the cumulative abnormal returns over five days surrounding acquisition 
announcements and the related euro wealth effects per year. The euro wealth effects are the cumulative abnormal 
returns for the event window times the acquirer’s market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year. The table 
shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
year n Mean Median % positive Total Mean Median
1993 61 1.42% *** 1.03% 69% 1,075.61 17.63 *** 2.03
1994 83 -0.05% -0.26% 41% -1,190.58 -14.34 -2.55
1995 97 0.00% -0.32% 42% -1,602.75 -16.52 -2.06
1996 86 1.09% *** 0.73% 59% 749.88 8.72 2.21
1997 89 1.66% *** 0.78% 57% 2,820.43 31.69 1.54
1998 102 0.85% 0.72% 64% 839.57 8.23 3.68
1999 116 2.20% *** 1.93% 61% 7,756.35 66.87 * 5.91
2000 83 1.10% * 1.19% 59% 4,103.12 49.44 11.84
2001 44 1.31% * 1.79% 66% -660.20 -15.00 4.58
2002 44 0.80% 0.56% 52% -4.66 -0.11 5.45
2003 27 1.22% 2.34% 59% 468.61 17.36 9.75
2004 33 1.31% *** 1.47% 73% 1,123.02 34.03 3.73
ALL 865 1.07% 0.61% 57% 15,478.40 17.89 2.22
Wealth effects in € millionsCAR [-2,2]
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Table 5: Regression analysis of acquirer return around acquisition announcements 
The table provides the results of ordinary least squares regressions that explain the abnormal returns during five days 
around acquisition announcements. All variables in this table are defined in Table 1. All regressions include year and 
industry dummies. P-values are documented in parentheses and based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected 
standard errors. The table shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Intercept 0.111 *** 0.114 *** 0.106 *** 0.097 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
Tobin's q -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.611) (0.172) (0.895) (0.890)
Free cash flow/total assets -0.011 0.144 -0.023 -0.003
(0.915) (0.209) (0.822) (0.973)
Return on assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.779) (0.378) (0.835) (0.841)
Leverage -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.002
(0.762) (0.833) (0.805) (0.863)
ln(size) -0.006 *** -0.003 ** -0.006 *** -0.005 ***
(0.000) (0.021) (0.002) (0.006)
Dummy equity payment 0.022 ** 0.000 0.023 ** 0.023 **
(0.044) (0.964) (0.035) (0.033)
Dummy listed target 0.002 -0.010 0.000 0.000
(0.826) (0.186) (0.977) (0.975)
Dummy diversifying -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(0.229) (0.536) (0.269) (0.228)
Dummy Domestic target -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.752) (0.962) (0.839) (0.807)
Dummy European target, but not Dutch -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.101) (0.584) (0.216) (0.211)
Dummy US target -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.822) (0.562) (0.930) (0.931)
Relative size of acquisition 0.058 ***
(0.000)
Relative size of the board 0.013 0.017
(0.468) (0.362)
Block shareholders 0.003 0.003
(0.730) (0.703)
Insider ownership -0.011 -0.008
(0.526) (0.656)
Dummy cross-listing US or UK -0.001 -0.003
(0.767) (0.486)
Takeover defense index -0.004 *
(0.060)
Dummy priority shares -0.005
(0.241)
Dummy preference shares 0.001
(0.910)
Dummy certificates -0.001
(0.779)
Dummy structured regime -0.010 *
(0.086)
Number of observations 865 644 865 865
Adjusted R -squared 5.11% 12.03% 4.66% 4.99%
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6: Differences between wealth-destructing deals and non-wealth-destructing deals 
This table presents the means, medians, standard deviations and the number of observations of firm years with wealth-destructing deals and firm years without 
wealth-destructing deals in panel A. The last two columns show the mean difference and the p-value of the mean difference between the two types of firm years. 
Panel B provides these statistics for wealth-destructing deals and non-wealth-destructing deals. A deal is classified as wealth-destructing when the negative 
wealth effect is more than €150 million. All variables in this table are defined in Table 1. The table shows *, ** and *** for mean differences that are 
significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Acquirer characteristics at a firm year level
Difference
 Mean (1) Median St.dev. N Mean (2) Median St.dev. N (1)-(2) p -value
Financial characteristics
Market capitalization (€ thousands) 1,542,605 423,689 6,037,254 266 11,981,138 8,434,009 10,410,379 46 -10,438,533 0.000
Leverage 0.274 0.247 0.187 266 0.310 0.239 0.195 46 -0.036 0.248
Tobin's q 1.459 1.302 0.664 266 2.067 1.805 1.081 46 -0.609 0.000
Free cash flow/total assets 0.031 0.034 0.036 266 0.039 0.037 0.032 46 -0.007 0.171
Return on assets 0.197 0.107 3.795 266 1.142 0.114 3.300 46 -0.945 0.113
Governance characteristics
Number of supervisory board members 3.271 3.000 1.588 266 4.891 5.000 1.251 46 -1.621 0.000
Number of executive board members 5.801 6.000 2.171 266 7.478 7.000 1.847 46 -1.678 0.000
Relative size of executive board 0.644 0.667 0.114 266 0.604 0.600 0.059 46 0.041 0.018
Percentage largest outside blockholder 0.171 0.100 0.182 266 0.163 0.090 0.184 46 0.008 0.789
Total percentage outside blockholders 0.305 0.240 0.242 266 0.207 0.150 0.185 46 0.098 0.009
Total percentage inside blockholders 0.066 0.000 0.148 266 0.011 0.000 0.074 46 0.055 0.014
Dummy cross listing US and/or UK 0.244 0.000 0.431 266 0.739 1.000 0.444 46 -0.495 0.000
Takeover defense index 2.211 2.000 1.014 266 1.848 2.000 0.918 46 0.363 0.018
Dummy priority shares 0.395 0.000 0.490 266 0.652 1.000 0.482 46 -0.257 0.001
Dummy preference shares 0.688 1.000 0.464 266 0.587 1.000 0.498 46 0.101 0.179
Dummy certificates 0.398 0.000 0.491 266 0.217 0.000 0.417 46 0.181 0.019
Dummy structured regime 0.729 1.000 0.445 266 0.391 0.000 0.493 46 0.338 0.000
Excl. firmyrs with wealth-destructing deals Firmyrs with wealth-destructing deals
 
Table 6: Differences between wealth destructing deals and non wealth destructing deals (continued) 
Panel B: Deal characteristics at a deal level
Difference
 Mean (1) Median St.dev. N Mean (2) Median St.dev. N (1)-(2) p -value
Transaction value (€ thousands) 469 70 1,232 130 824 363 968 22 -354 0.138
Transaction value/market capitalization 0.148 0.037 0.271 130 0.068 0.028 0.099 22 0.080 0.176
Sales target/sales acquirer 0.099 0.017 0.300 513 0.038 0.004 0.119 42 0.061 0.008
Dummy listed target 0.064 0.000 0.244 785 0.150 0.000 0.359 80 -0.086 0.004
Dummy diversifying acquisition 0.201 0.000 0.401 785 0.238 0.000 0.428 80 -0.036 0.470
Dummy focus shifting acquisition 0.048 0.000 0.215 785 0.050 0.000 0.219 80 -0.002 0.951
Dummy payment in equity 0.064 0.000 0.244 785 0.013 0.000 0.112 80 0.051 0.064
Dummy payment in cash 0.196 0.000 0.397 785 0.138 0.000 0.347 80 0.059 0.204
Dummy payment in cash and equity 0.039 0.000 0.195 785 0.000 0.000 0.000 80 0.039 0.070
Dummy domestic acquisition 0.246 0.000 0.431 785 0.188 0.000 0.393 80 0.058 0.245
Dummy European acquisition (excluding NL) 0.452 0.000 0.498 355 0.375 0.000 0.487 80 0.077 0.186
Dummy US acquisition 0.181 0.000 0.385 142 0.300 0.000 0.461 80 -0.119 0.010
Excl. wealth-destructing deals Wealth-destructing deals
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Table 7: Regression analysis explaining the likelihood of a wealth-destructing acquisition 
announcement 
The table provides the results of a binary logit regression that explains the likelihood of an acquisition announcement 
to be wealth destructing. A deal is classified as wealth-destructing when the negative wealth effect is more than €150 
million. All variables in this table are defined in Table 1. The regression includes year and industry dummies. P-
values are documented in parentheses and based on Huber/White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. The 
table shows *, ** and *** for values that are significantly different from zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Coefficient
(p -value)
Intercept -28.020 ***
(0.000)
Tobin's q 0.995 ***
(0.000)
Free cash flow/total assets 4.451
(0.634)
Return on assets 0.059
(0.393)
Leverage 3.696 ***
(0.005)
ln(size) 1.509 ***
(0.000)
Dummy equity payment -1.105
(0.298)
Dummy listed target 0.472
(0.279)
Dummy diversifying 0.455
(0.194)
Dummy European target, but not Dutch 0.339
(0.452)
Dummy Domestic target 0.841
(0.131)
Dummy US target 0.329
(0.521)
Relative size of the board -3.981 *
(0.079)
Block shareholders 0.720
(0.553)
Insider ownership 0.986
(0.744)
Dummy cross-listing US or UK 0.700
(0.215)
Dummy priority shares 0.995 *
(0.056)
Dummy preference shares -0.899 *
(0.072)
Dummy certificates 0.193
(0.715)
Dummy structured regime -0.163
(0.774)
Number of observations 865
McFadden R -squared 35.68%
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
Figure 1: The development of abnormal returns around acquisition announcements 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of the days around acquisition announcements. The day 
of the announcement is day zero.  
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Figure 2: The distribution of abnormal returns 
This figure provides the distribution of the five days cumulative abnormal returns around acquisition announcements. 
The horizontal axis shows the five days cumulative abnormal returns and the vertical axis shows the frequency in 
which this return occurs.  
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Figure 3: The number of acquisition announcements and the total wealth effects per year 
This figure shows the number of acquisitions and the total aggregated wealth effects over five days around 
acquisition announcements per announcement year. The left vertical axis provides the number of acquisitions, the 
right vertical axis shows the total wealth effects in millions of euros and the horizontal axis shows the announcement 
year.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 De Jong, Kabir, Marra and Röell (2001) provide an extensive description about the ownership 
and control of listed firms in the Netherlands.  
2 The 1996 Act on Disclosure of Holdings in Listed Companies, provides that any person, who 
directly or indirectly, acquires or disposes of an interest in the capital and/or the voting right of 
public limited liability company incorporated under Dutch law with an official listing on a stock 
exchange, must give a written notice of such acquisition or disposal, if as a result of such 
acquisition or disposal the percentage of capital interest or voting rights held by such person falls 
within another percentage range held by such person prior to the acquisition or disposal. The 
relevant percentage ranges referred to in the Disclosure of Holdings Act are 0% to 5%; 5% to 
10%; 10% to 25%; 25% to 50%; 50% to 66%; and over 66%. 
3 Most of the takeover activity is concentrated in Europe and the US. For example, only 4.1% of 
the deals concern Asian targets, 1.2% are acquisitions of African firms and 2.7% concern non-US 
companies from the American continents. 
4 Our sample includes eight deals with shareholders’ losses of more than €1 billion. 
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